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enrichment analysis in conventional subrogation cases (Cheltenham &
Gloucester plc. v. Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291 at [49]), although
they do now seem committed to it as the explanation underpinning
subrogation (Filby v. Mortgage Express (No. 2) Ltd. [2004] EWCA
Civ 759 at [62]). Uniformity in the common law is desirable, but it
seems this is another instance where “the common law is no longer
monolithic” (B. v. Auckland District Law Society [2003] UKPC 38 at
[55], [2003] 2 A.C. 736).
MATTHEW CONAGLEN AND PETER TURNER
VIRTUAL ASSIGNMENTS AND LEASEHOLD ALIENATION COVENANTS
COMMERCIAL leases invariably contain express limitations on the
otherwise unfettered right of tenants to assign or sublet their leasehold
interest to third parties. Landlords use these clauses to insulate them-
selves from financially risky or undesirable assignees or subtenants.
Traditionally, the courts have interpreted covenants against alienation
strictly and contra proferentem. Thus, it is unsurprising that the Court
of Appeal held in Clarence House Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank
plc. [2009] EWCA Civ 1311, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1651 that the “virtual
assignment” of a lease did not breach standard-form leasehold cove-
nants against alienation.
Despite being described by Ward L.J. in Clarence House as “strange
new beasts in the forest”, virtual assignments have become increasingly
common in the commercial leasehold sector. Under these contracts a
tenant generally transfers to a third party all of the economic benefits
and burdens accruing under a lease (including management responsi-
bilities), but not the leasehold interest itself.
Tenants with large property portfolios apparently prize virtual as-
signments for their capacity to facilitate leasehold dealings, without
falling foul of covenants against alienation. Arguably, since their effect
is only contractual rather than proprietary, there is no need to seek the
landlord’s consent to the transaction. The potential delay, expense and
risk of refusal inherent in seeking consent can therefore be avoided.
From the landlord’s perspective, virtual assignments offer tenants an
unwelcome ability to undermine the effectiveness of expressly agreed
covenants against alienation.
These issues were at play in Clarence House itself. The case involved
a 25-year commercial lease of office premises in Manchester (“the
property”). The lease contained various common restrictions against
alienation including covenants prohibiting the (i) execution of any de-
claration of trust over the property or the lease; (ii) sharing, possession
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or occupation of all or part of the property, or parting with possession
or occupation; (iii) underletting the whole of the property without the
landlord’s prior written consent; and (iv) assigning the property with-
out the landlord’s prior written consent.
The tenant, National Westminster Bank plc. (“NatWest”), underlet
the whole property to another company, Mercer, in 2001 whilst re-
taining a nominal three-day reversion of the leasehold interest. The
sub-lease was entered into with the permission of the landlord
(“Clarence House”), and NatWest ceased occupying the premises. In
2005 NatWest’s parent company, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group
plc. (“RBS”), entered into a virtual assignment of its leasehold interest
in the property with New Liberty Property Holdings Ltd. (“New
Liberty”), an offshore Gibraltarian company. Under this agreement
the economic benefits and burdens of NatWest’s lease, and the sub-
lease with Mercer, passed to New Liberty. NatWest appointed New
Liberty as its agent giving it authority to act on its behalf and in its
name when paying rent, negotiating rent reviews, and collecting rent
due fromMercer. Additionally, NatWest executed a Power of Attorney
in favour of New Liberty that gave it authority to do whatever was
“necessary or advisable” to give proper effect to the virtual assignment.
Clarence House remained unaware of the virtual assignment
until some months later. On discovering that it was dealing with an
“unforthcoming Gibraltarian company”, rather than its pre-credit
crunch “copper-bottomed high street bank”, Clarence House sought
a declaration that the virtual assignment breached the covenants
against alienation. Clarence House’s concerns about New Liberty were
well-founded; not only was the rent in arrears, but also provisional
liquidators of New Liberty were later appointed.
The Court of Appeal (Ward, Jacob and Warren L.JJ.) in Clarence
House agreed with the High Court decision of H.H.J. Hodge Q.C. that
there had been no breach of the covenants against sub-letting, assign-
ment or declaration of trust. However, unlike the High Court, the
Court of Appeal held that there had not been a breach of the covenant
against sharing or parting with possession. Ward L.J. confirmed that
“possession” should not be conflated with “occupation”, but rather
should be defined in its “normal, and technically legally correct mean-
ing” (per Neuberger L.J. in Akici v. LR Butlin Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ
1296, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 292, at [26]). As such, “possession” refers not
only to exclusive occupation, but also includes “the receipt of rents and
profits or the right to receive the same, if any” (section 205(1)(xix) of
the Law of Property Act 1925 (“LPA 1925”)).
Ward L.J.’s somewhat opaque remarks [32(2)–(5)] in Clarence
House suggest mistakenly that NatWest had already fully divested
itself of “possession” of the property in 2001 when it entered into the
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permitted underlease with Mercers. Thus it was argued that NatWest
could not have parted with or shared possession under the virtual
assignment with New Liberty, and would not have breached the
alienation provisions. Whilst it is true that NatWest did not occupy
the premises after 2001, it retained its reversionary leasehold estate
and continued to receive rent from its subtenant Mercers. As such
NatWest continued to fall within the broader technical meaning of
“possession” under section 205(1)(xix) LPA 1925. Thus, at the point
of entering into the virtual assignment with New Liberty, contrary
to Ward L.J.’s suggestion, NatWest could be said to have parted with
or shared possession in breach of its leasehold covenants with Clarence
House.
So far, so good for Clarence House. However, Ward L.J. noted that
the virtual assignment and Power of Attorney were grounded in con-
tractual, agency-like terms. New Liberty collected rents in NatWest’s
name, not its own. Thus there was no transfer or sharing of the right to
receive rents as envisaged by section 205(1)(xix) LPA 1925. Whilst New
Liberty held those rents for its own benefit, this was due to the con-
tractual arrangements contained in the virtual assignment, rather than
in the sense of sharing or being put into possession of the property.
Whilst this approach may be technically defensible, it underlines
the highly pro-tenant bias of the English courts when faced with the
interpretation of leasehold covenants. It remains open to landlords to
include express prohibitions against virtual assignments, if they know
of their existence and wish to do so. However, as in Clarence House, the
emphasis upon protecting tenants does not always fairly reflect the
relative business acumen of the parties to commercial leases.
EMMA WARING
PRE-NUPS, PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND PATERNALISM
MARITAL agreements (i.e. pre-nuptial, post-nuptial and separation
agreements) are among the most debated topics in family law and form
part of the Law Commission’s Tenth Programme of Law Reform. For
now, the latest word on pre-nuptial agreements is the decision of the
Court of Appeal inRadmacher v.Granatino [2009] EWCACiv 649. The
decision is important first because it marks a clear departure from
previous case law, and secondly because of its open criticism of the
approach of the Privy Council in MacLeod v. MacLeod [2008] UKPC
64, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 437 (noted by Miles [2009] C.L.J. 285) and its clear
emphasis on private autonomy over paternalism. The third issue of
importance is the international dimension of the case, which cannot be
explored here (but see Miles [2009] C.F.L.Q. 513).
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